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ABSTRACT Widespread alarm over the continuing decline of 
marine and freshwater fisheries has prompted research on the the- 
ory and practice of community-based management (CBM). Con- 
sidering the suite of possible CBM benefits-including local 
involvement, compliance with regulations, reduced enforcement 
costs, and sustainable resource use--it is understandable that CBM 
projects are on the rise. However, there is insufficient examina- 
tion of the challenges to CBM and the context-specific feasibility 
of grassroots stewardship. In response, we applied an assessment 
framework to a Venezuelan fishery to evaluate the feasibility of 
CBM and to identify barriers to its hi t ion.  We used a variety of 
methods in concert (including observation, Rapid Rural Appraisal, 
a survey, and interviews) to assess the characteristics of the 1) re- 
source, 2) user group, and 3) governing institutions. Our results 
show that resource and user group characteristics are CBM com- 
patible. The negative influence of all institutional characteiis- 
tics-particularly impediments to local participation and the 
prevalence of corruption-makes CBM unfeasible in the study site 
at this time. We discuss these barriers and their implications. 
The details of reforms necessary to facilitate CBM and prevent 
fish species loss are, however, beyond the scope of this study. 
*For their generous support and contributions, the authors thank 1) Dr. Donald 
Taphorn, Director, and the faculty and staff at the Museo de Zoologia, Univer- 
sidad Nacional Experimental de Los Llanos Occidentales "Ezequiel Zamora"; 
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and Carlos Hidalgo in Guanare, Venezuela; 2) the residents of El Potrero, 
Quebrada del Mambn, and Nueva Florida in the State of Portuguesa, Vene- 
zuela; and 3) Dr. Alex Flecker, Cornell University. The J. William Fulbright 
Foreign Scholarship Board, the Institute of International Education, and the 
Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station provided funding for the 
research. 
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Despite the best efforts of managers and policymakers worldwide, 
diminishing species and disappearing or degraded ecosystems are 
clear signs that humans are not using natural resources sustainably. 
This brings into question the efficacy of conventional top-down 
strategies that dominated natural resources management in the 
twentieth century. In response, there is a burgeoning interest - both 
domestically and internationally - in alternative approaches that 
devolve decision-making and management responsibilities to local 
resource users. In the current natural resources management era, 
grassroots stewardship is paramount to enforced compliance of 
hierarchical rules. Community-based management (CBM) is a term 
commonly applied to decentralized, grassroots approaches to natu- 
ral resources management. 
In fisheries management, for example, widespread alarm 
over the continuing decline in marine and freshwater stocks 
(McGinn 1998; Newton and Dillingham 1997) has prompted re- 
search on the theory and practice of CBM. considering the suite of 
possible community-based fishery management benefits-including 
local-level involvement (Nugent, Wellman and Leibovitz 1996), 
acceptance and compliance with regulations (Davis and Bailey 
1996:26 1 -2), reduced costs for enforcement (Renard 199 1 :5), and 
ultimately, sustainable use of fishery resources (Christie, White and 
Buhat 1994: 116)-it is understandable that proponents are anxious 
to initiate CBM projects. "The greatest impediment to achieving 
these goals" observed Kenney "may be an 'over enthusiasm' of 
some of its proponents" (1999:37). 
There is a paucity of research and literature exploring the 
challenges inherent to CBM and acknowledging the complexity 
involved with putting management in the hands of the local people. 
In many forums, CBM has received the simplified tieatment of 
hand it over to the people and they21 do what's best for the re- 
sources and their fiture. According to Little (1994:349), "An 
improved understanding of the different social, political, and his- 
torical contexts under which local conservation takes place will 
help debunk the false notion that all communities, if left alone, are 
able to defend and conserve their resources in a sustainable fash- 
ion." CBM proponents must be wary to invest the patience, time, 
and strategic planning necessary to maximize the probability of 
long-term, project success. This involves identifying existing 
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inroads and potential roadblocks during the initial stages of project 
inventory and design that can help or hinder a CBM effort. 
Assessment Framework 
To address this research need, we evaluated the feasibility of CBM 
in a Venezuelan fishery using a CBM assessment ffamework 
adapted from Gardner and Stern's (1996) checklist of community- 
management criteria. Gardner and Stern's ( 1996: 130) checklist 
outlines characteristics of successful CBM initiatives based on 
themes identified by Ostrom (1990) in her extensive analysis of 
case studies involving the sustainable use of common-pool re- 
sources. Government action at the regional and national levels was 
the only theme suggested by Ostrom that was not included in Gard- 
ner and Stern's framework. Therefore, we added criteria drawn 
from Gardner and Stern's (1996:134-5) discussion of institutional 
openness to our framework that assess the characteristics of gov- 
emment and institutions. Gardner and Stem's theme of evaluating 
rules developed by the user group was not considered because this 
study assessed a proposed CBM initiative rather than an ongoing 
project. Willingness to participate was added as a criterion of 
characteristics of the user group because it is a crucial component 
of CBM efforts. This point is articulated by Vivian (199 1 : 1): 
Resource management projects, as currently im- 
plemented, depend heavily on broad-based co- 
operation and collaboration because they often rely 
on the combined actions of individuals which, 
whether they be planting trees or refraining from 
overfishing, by their nature cannot easily be co- 
erced or enforced. The willingness of people to 
undertake the required activities-what is com- 
monly understood as their 'participation1-is there- 
fore essential for the success of these projects. 
Our final assessment framework contained criteria grouped 
into three general themes: 1) characteristics of the resource, 2) 
characteristics of the user group, and 3) characteristics of govern- 
ment and institutions (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. CBM Assessment Framework Applied to Feasibility of 
Community-Based Fishery Management, Portuguesa River 
Watershed, Venezuela, 1998. 
Criteria for 
Successful CBM' 
Indicator 
Assessment Value for 
~ e t h o d ~  Portuguesa River 
I. Characteristics of the Resource 
Resource is controllable locally - RRAd 
- Definable boundaries -RRA 
- Resources stay within boundaries - Observation 
- Resource can be monitored - Observation 
11. Characteristics of the User Group 
Local resource dependence 
- Perce~tible threat of resource deoletion 
- ~iffidulty of finding resource substitutes 
- Difficulty of leaving area 
Presence of community 
- Stable, small populations 
- Network of social interactions 
- Shared norms for upholding agreements 
- Local knowledge informs effective rules 
Willingness to participate 
- Survey 
- Survey 
- Observatiodsurvey 
- Observatiodsurvey 
- Survey 
-RRA 
- Observatiodsurvey 
- RWSurvey 
- RRAlSurvey 
- Survey 
111. Characteristics of Govt & Institutions 
Devolution of power to local level 
- Government values local knowledge 
- Rules are product of participatory choice 
- Legal status given to local regulations 
Corruption-free, fair enforcement 
- Bribes and cheating not permitted 
- Selfishness, social elites not awarded 
- Government accountable to local users 
- Observation 
- Observationhterviews 
- Observationhterviews 
- Observationflnterviews 
- Observationhterviews 
- Observationhterviews 
- Observationhterviews 
- Observationhterviews 
"Criteria adapted from Gardner and Stem (1 996) and Ostrom( 1990). 
. , . , 
b~bservatio"s, RRA, a quantitative survey, and interviews with key informants 
were the methods used alone or in concert to evaluate each criterion. 
'Each criterion is a positive or negative indicator of the current feasibility of CBM 
in the Portuguesa River fishery. 
d RRA is an acronym for Rapid Rural Appraisal, a participatory research 
methodology. 
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Study Site 
The CBM assessment framework is designed to be applicable to a 
variety of natural resource management contexts. For our study, we 
used the framework to assess the feasibility of community-based 
fishery management in a freshwater fishery in the Orinoco River 
basin in Venezuela, South America. Originating in the Andean 
piedmont, rivers throughout the state of Portuguesa flow downward 
into the vast Orinoco River floodplains called the llanos. This 
transition coincides with a marked increase in fish species diversity, 
from 80 species in the piedmont (Matthews 1998:40-1) to over 200 
species in the llanos (Winemiller et al. 1996:23). The two distinct 
physical portions of these watersheds are linked ecologically 
through the biannual migrations of numerous fish species (Wine- 
miller, Marrero and Taphorn 1996:16,32). We selected the Portu- 
guesa River because it is one of the few commercially important 
rivers in the Orinoco basin that is not yet dammed. This ensures 
that fishing practices of fishers upstream and downstream were 
linked by freely-migrating fish populations. 
For generations the well-being and livelihood of fishing 
communities has depended on exploitation of this fishery resource 
(Duran 1995:22). Fishery managers and researchers are concerned 
by a recent decline of commercial fish species, raising questions 
about the sustainability of current fishing practices and the potential 
loss of biodiversity if these trends continue (Novoa 1986; Winemil- 
ler et al. 1996). This situation makes CBM considerations in the 
Portuguesa River watershed appropriate from both biological and 
sociological perspectives. We applied our CBM assessment 
framework to an in-depth study of fishery management in the state 
of Portuguesa to evaluate the compatibility of current characteris- 
tics of the resource, user group, and governing institutions with 
CBM. 
We studied three villages along the Portuguesa River that 
were similar in population size, distance from the river, and in their 
relative interaction with Guanare, the capital city of the state of 
Portuguesa. Upstream to downstream, the three villages were 1) El 
Potrero in the piedmont, 2) Quebrada del Mam6n and 3) Nueva 
Florida in the llanos. Guanare was the site of most data collection 
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from government-employed fishery officials and university-based 
fishery researchers. 
Methods 
Spanning eight months in 1998, we gathered data in the state of 
Portuguesa, Venezuela, which we compared to the CBM assessment 
framework criteria. Each criterion was considered in light of the 
current circumstances of the Portuguesa River watershed, communi- 
ties, and governing institutions. We used a variety of methods in 
concert (including observation, Rapid Rural Appraisal, a quantita- 
tive survey, and interviews) to determine if each assessment frame- 
work criterion was sufficiently present or absent in the Portuguesa 
River watershed to be designated as a positive or negative indicator 
of CBM feasibility. For each overarching characteristic - e.g. 
resource, user-group, or governance - we considered the cumulative 
positive andlor negative assessment of the associated criteria and 
concluded whether or not CBM was possible at present for that 
characteristic. 
Observation 
For our Venezuelan case-study, we consistently used observation 
and descriptive note-taking in the village, institutional, and univer- 
sity environments we encountered. Observation is a qualitative 
research method that can be used independently, for example by 
anthropologists in ethnographic research (Frake 1988), or in addi- 
tion to methodologies used by a variety of research disciplines such 
as sociology, history, political science, and ecology (Yin 1994:87). 
Requiring researcher presence at the study site-fcl example, a 
village, a corporation, or a forest+bservation is less of a skill, than 
an art that "involves the interweaving of looking and listening, of 
watching and asking" (Lofland and Lofland 1995:19). Typically, 
detailed descriptive field notes are taken that enable interpretation 
and analysis by both the researcher and others at a later time and 
away from the study setting (Patton 1990:241-2). While the de- 
scriptions should be as objective as possible, subjective interpreta- 
tions, labeled as such by the researcher, are also included in field 
notes (Patton 1990:241). Observation provides a contextual insight 
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that is useful for understanding and explaining results of other 
methods such as quantitative surveys. To avoid bias, triangulation 
with other methods or with other researchers' observations of the 
same phenomenon is recommendable (Yin 1994:90-4). 
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) 
Approximately one month was spent in each village conducting a 
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA). RRA techniques were used to 
document local knowledge regarding declining fish populations in 
the Portuguesa River and shed light on the socio-economic and 
historical factors influencing rural fishery use and river health. A 
community map, historical profile, Venn diagram, and river-fishery 
map were made by residents at each site (for details on RRA and its 
application in the Portuguesa River watershed see Zanetell and 
Knuth 2002). These RRA techniques are only a sampling of the 
RRA tools available to researchers for garnering local participation 
in the research process (Khan and Suryanata 1994; Pretty et al. 
1995). 
RRA is closely associated with Participatory Rural Ap- 
praisal (PRA). The primary distinction is that in RRA, there is a 
predetermined research agenda or question, whereas in PRA the 
local participants determine for themselves what questions they will 
study and the purpose of the research. While RRA typically begins 
and ends with data collechon, PRA is often used to initiate local 
action and facilitate change (Chambers 1994). Both RRA and PRA 
aim to engage local knowledge, and this requires recognition that 
intelligence is not constrained to diploma-bearing scientists and a 
methodology that serves as a conduit between rural peoples and 
researchers. Chambers (1992--quoted in Freudenberger 1994:9) 
stated that the common notion that rural people are uneducated is 
"an artifact of our ignorance of how to enable them to express, 
share and extend their knowledge." RRA techniques facilitate local 
participation in the research process. The hope is that by involving 
people in the research rather than simply studying them, the infor- 
mation gathered will be more complete and informative than data 
generated solely by quantitative surveys (Gill 1993). 
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Quantitative Survey 
A quantitative survey measuring willingness to participate in com- 
munity-based fishery management was given to 221 heads of 
households in the Portuguesa River watershed. Based on a litera- 
ture review, observations, and the RRA, we constructed scales to 
measure the influence on the dependent variable willingness to 
participate of five independent variables: I) dependence on the 
fishery; 2) perception about the state of the fishery; 3) level of 
concern about the fishery; 4) perceived locus of authority over the 
fishery; and 5) sense of community. Responses to scale items as 
well as mean scores for the 16-item sense of community scale and 
the 6-item willingness to participate scale contributed to the evalua- 
tion of several of the CBM assessment framework criteria. 
Sample-size. We calculated the sample size for each village 
using the following criteria: 1) each village had a finite population 
determined by the number of households; 2) the outcome of the 
response variable-Willingness to Participate-is binary across the 
villages (i.e. willing or not willing); and 3) the test for significance 
is set at the .05 level; with 4) a power to detect differences of 0.15 
between villages. These criteria required a sample of 80 house- 
holds in El Potrero, and 65 households in each of Quebrada del 
Mam6n and Nueva Florida. We used a random numbers table (Ott 
1993:A-23) to generate the sample for each village. We actually 
surveyed 81 households in El Potrero, 66 in Quebrada del Mambn, 
and 74 in Nueva Florida. In each village, only 1-3 households 
refused to participate in the survey. These refusals were handled by 
substituting the declining household with the nearest house not 
already selected as part of the random sample. We questioned the 
head of each participating household for a total of 124 adult male 
respondents and 97 adult female respondents. 
Survey enumeration and analysis. To make the survey as 
understandable as possible to respondents, we pre-tested item 
content and word usage with a group of Venezuelans who regularly 
fished in the Portuguesa River but did not live in any of the study 
sites. The final survey was given orally in each site by a group of 
10 young men and women from the three villages who attended the 
university in the city of Guanare. Response validity was high 
because it was difficult to mislead the assistants who had them- 
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selves grown up along the Portuguesa River. Surveys in each 
village were given in a concentrated two-day effort. Survey train- 
ing was done the first morning of each site visit. A "round-robin" 
training technique (Weinberg 1983:343-7) taught correct voice level 
and pace, probing without leading, and how to record responses. 
We analyzed survey data using an SPSS 1999 statistical software 
package for social science research. 
Interviews 
Observation and recommendations lead to the identification of 25 
key informants from village, government, and academic sectors that 
were not only knowledgeable about the fishery, but also respected 
by their peers. Yin (1994:84) suggests that key informants are 
those individuals whose insights critically inform the current case- 
study as well as future inquiry. From the three villages, a total of 
15 key informants were interviewed. Of these, nine were village 
elders (all male) and six were adults between the ages of 35 - 50 
years old (three male, three female). From the Universidad Na- 
cional Experimental de 10s Llanos Occidentales "Ezequiel Zamora" 
(UNELLEZ) in Guanare, State of Portuguesa, five scientists were 
interviewed as key informants (two male, three female). The Minis- 
try of Agriculture and Livestock (MAC) and the Ministry of the 
Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (MARNR) are the 
two government agencies involved with fishery management in the 
state of Portuguesa. From these agencies, five key informants were 
interviewed (four male, one female). 
Each key informant was interviewed in a familiar setting 
(Yow 199457) for 1-2 hours. We encouraged interactive conversa- 
tion (Albrecht, Johnson and Walther 1993) and probe questions 
(Patton 1990:324-7) ensured that a "guided conversation" (Lofland 
and Lofland 1995:85) occurred on the theme of CBM feasibility. 
Notes taken during interviews were augmented immediately follow- 
ing to capture all significant information. All quotes in this text are 
in English although some interviews were conducted in Spanish. 
Translations represent as closely as possible the original content 
and intent of the interviewee. Key informant opinions are in re- 
sponse to the current situation in the state of Portuguesa and do not 
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necessarily reflect the state of fishery management and the feasibil- 
ity of CBM in other sectors of Venezuela. 
Results: Characteristics of the Resource 
Resource Is Controllable Locally 
The results of the RRA map-making activities indicate that biannual 
spawning migrations in the Portuguesa River-some more than 200 
kilometers from the piedmont to the llanos (Winemiller et al. 
1996:23)- will require coordinated local control between fishing 
villages throughout the watershed. This added complexity is a 
negative indicator of the feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River 
watershed. 
Definable Boundaries 
The Portuguesa River has definable physical boundaries indicated 
by fishers on RRA maps and corresponding to official topographic 
maps (Direccion de Cartografia Nacional 1975). Fishers in each 
village demonstrated a thorough familiarity and understanding of 
the physical characteristics of the river and seasonal factors influ- 
encing fish activity within the stretch of Portuguesa River they 
fished most frequently. The challenge, however, is that fish migrate 
upstream and downstream of each village's normal fishing bounda- 
ries. "Migratory fish populations cover areas many orders of mag- 
nitude greater than those of proposed or traditional property 
boundaries" (Welcomme 1985-cited by Bayley 1992:7). There- 
fore, definable boundaries are positive indicators, at the local level, 
and negative indicators, at the watershed level, rekarding CBM 
feasibility. 
Resources Stay Within Their Boundaries 
In addition to natural migrations in and out of local boundaries, the 
movements of fish are subject to market demands. Fish caught by 
subsistence fishers normally stay in the basin of origin, whereas fish 
harvested by commercial fishers are transported by middle-men to 
markets throughout Venezuela. Increasing demand for fish in the 
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Venezuelan markets has prompted rural fishers to increase fishing 
pressure (Duran 1995:22) on the fish species of most concern to 
fishery managers (Duran 1995) and researchers (Winemiller et al. 
1996) as being threatened with extinction. Therefore, the fish 
species in most critical need of protection are the most likely to be 
removed from the basin they inhabited. The exportation of fishery 
resources from their local boundaries is a negative indicator of the 
feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa watershed. 
Changes In The Resource Can Be Adequately Monitored 
Information gathered by villagers during daily fishing trips inform 
continual assessments of fish stock status and factors influencing 
fishery health. These assessments were far more accurate than 
judgments made by fishery inspectors located in central offices 
(personal observation 1998). Family ties and neighbor relationships 
were conducive to information sharing between villagers of new 
conditions and changes in the fishery. This communication net- 
work is an indication that the local users currently monitor the 
fishery for their own benefit, and would be able to do so for the 
purposes of community-based management. The capacity to moni- 
tor resources locally is a positive indicator of the feasibility of 
CBM, although comprehensive monitoring of migrating fish popu- 
lations will require establishing communication networks between 
all Portuguesa River fishing villages. 
Results: Characteristics of the User Group 
Local Resource Dependence 
From all three villages, 54 percent of survey respondents agreed 
with the statement: "Your ability to provide food for the people in 
this house is dependent on living near the Portuguesa River." Of all 
respondents, 46 percent agreed that "the money you make is de- 
pendent on living near the Portuguesa River." These results indi- 
cate that at least half of the current watershed residents would be 
affected negatively by the loss of the fishery and that continued 
availability of this resource plays a vital role in watershed socio- 
economic stability. This demonstrated reliance on the Portuguesa 
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River fishery is a positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM. 
Perceptible threat of resource depletion. Of all the house- 
holds surveyed in the Portuguesa River watershed, 75 percent 
believe that there are less fish than in the past, 69 percent hold that 
average fish size has decreased, and 83 percent stated that they 
catch less fish in one hour with a cast net today than in the past. 
Despite these warning signs of impending fishery collapse, concur- 
rent local concern is lacking because fish remain sufficiently abun- 
dant to support commercial and artisanal fishing (personal 
observation 1998). Therefore, perceived resource depletion is 
considered both a positive and negative indicator of the feasibility 
of CBM. 
DlfJiCulw of finding substitutes for local resources. Gard- 
ner and Stern (1996) held that community management efforts are 
typically more successful where the natural resource of concern 
cannot be replaced with a functionally-comparable or socially- 
acceptable substitute. In Venezuela, there is not a national reliance 
on the Portuguesa River commercial fishery. There is, however, 
local reliance on the fishery as a food source, particularly of protein 
(Chapman 1979:38; Novoa 1986: 184). Of all households surveyed, 
84 percent participated in subsistence fishing. The difficulty of 
finding substitutes for the fishery is a conservation incentive to 
local users and thus a positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM in 
the Portuguesa River watershed. 
DlfJiculw or expense attached to leaving area. Related to 
resource substitutability is the issue of whether or not an occupa- 
tional substitute exists for the fishers (48 percent) who depend on 
commercial fishing in the Portuguesa River as their principal in- 
come. A government report (Agiiin 1997:7) stated that the lack of 
employment options in Venezuela is limiting the op;lortunities of 
village fishers to find work elsewhere, attracting outsiders to join 
the ranks of local commercial fishers, and accelerating fishing 
pressure in the Portuguesa River. Statistics in a 1997 national 
report on sustainable development (Bohbrquez, Chacin and Viana 
1997:9) illustrate a deepening rift in Venezuela's population of over 
22 million people between a rich minority and a poor majority: 
60 percent of urban residents live in impoverished condi- 
tions, 
the "poverty index" (the sum of unemployment rates and 
12
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 18 [2002], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol18/iss2/6
142 Southern Rural Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2002 
consumer inflation rates) rose from 8.6 percent in 1970 to 
52.2 percent in 1993, 
the percentage of homes in poverty climbed from 36 per- 
cent in 1984 to 62 percent in 1993, and 
the percentage of homes under extreme poverty, that is, un- 
able to cover the cost of basic food, increased from 1 1 per- 
cent to 33 percent during the same period. 
These statistics suggest that the Portuguesa River fishery 
provides a higher level of food and income security than could be 
found by the watershed residents if they were to search for work in 
other areas of the country. This is an incentive for villagers to fish 
sustainably. The difficulty and expense of leaving the area is a 
positive indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River water- 
shed. 
Presence Of Community 
As its name implies, community-based conservation is rooted in the 
concept of community. According to Gardner and Stern 
(1996: 143), "there is a connection between community resource 
management and the strength of community feeling." In our survey, 
a 5-point scale measured sense of community where a score of 5 
was high and a score of 1 was low. The mean score of all house- 
holds surveyed was 4.2, suggesting a widespread and high sense of 
community in the watershed, which is a positive indicator of the 
feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River watershed. 
Stable, usually small population. A discussion coincident 
to RRA community map-making suggested that the population of 
each village grew rapidly in the 1960s following a governmental 
land reform program that encouraged settlement and dlvelopment 
of Venezuela's rural areas (Smith 1974). Following this influx and 
growth, villagers stated that the populations of each village have 
remained relatively stable. In 1998, the number of households in El 
Potrero was 125, in Quebrada del Mam6n was 90, and in Nueva 
Florida was 92. These stable and small village populations are 
positive indicators of CBM feasibility. 
- Thick network of social interactions. Observations indicate 
that extensive familial relationships and kinship ties in the three 
villages have existed for generations (personal observations 1998). 
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Two questions from the sense of community scale also demonstrate 
the extent of villager interactions and social interdependence. To 
the question "The friendships and associations you have with other 
people in your village mean a lot to you," 86 percent of households 
surveyed in the three sites combined agreed. Villagers were also 
asked, "You regularly stop and talk with people in your village" to 
which 80 percent agreed. The responses to these questions show 
that there is a high level of village networking and connection. The 
results of these survey questions and direct observations in the 
villages merit the designation of a network of social interactions as 
a positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM. 
Shared norms, especially norms for upholding agreements. 
In the three villages, 80 percent of surveyed households responded 
that they agree with other villagers about what is important in life, 
indicating shared norms. During RRA activities, the Neighborhood 
Association in each village was identified as vital to conflict resolu- 
tion, the organization of community activities, and for facilitating 
compliance with community agreements. The existence of shared 
norms and community organizations for upholding agreements is a 
positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM. 
Resource users have suflcient local knowledge of the 
resource to devise fair and effective rules. RRA river-fishery maps 
illustrated detailed familiarity with the ecological and seasonal 
processes affecting fish species behavior and fishing activities in 
the Portuguesa River watershed. Clearly, the breadth and depth of 
this local knowledge can inform conservation plans and is a positive 
indicator for successful future CBM. 
Willingness to participate. In our survey, a 5-point scale 
measured willingness to participate where a score of 5 was high and 
a score of 1 was low. The mean response of all households sur- 
veyed was 4.04, suggesting that residents were very willing to 
participate in localized fishery protection efforts. Considering the 
scale items singly, 81.5 percent of respondents said they were 
willing to participate in CBM efforts, 84 percent were willing to 
work with other people from their village in such conservation 
efforts, and 67 percent were willing to work with people from other 
villages in the watershed. These results are important because the 
resource control assessment suggested that migrating fish popula- 
tions require coordinated watershed management. Therefore, 
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willingness to participate at both the local and watershed level is a 
positive indicator of the feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River 
watershed. 
Results: Characteristics of Government and Institutions 
Devolution of Power to Local Level 
Community-based fishery management is possible to the extent that 
the laws and government allow it to be. The willingness of govern- 
ing agencies and institutions to devolve power is as important as the 
willingness of the people to participate. Studies in Colombia 
(Lowenstein 1989) and in the Caribbean (Renard 1991) have re- 
vealed that local-level natural resource management projects have 
been limited by centralized government policies and regulations 
that perpetuate "a tradition of non-participation" (Renard 1991:6). 
This appears to be the case in Venezuela where the current, top- 
down management of the freshwater fisheries dates back to the laws 
established by the 1944 Law of the Fishery (Ley de Pesca 1944). 
State and regional natural resource managers are charged with 
enforcing rules made in Caracas that do not incorporate the unique 
needs and characteristics of the varying watersheds they oversee. 
Due to the variable timing of spawning migrations and the 
site-specificity of fish assemblages, standardized application of gear 
restrictions and closed seasons can deleteriously affect fish popula- 
tions. Research indicates that although certain fish species are 
found throughout the llanos, a vast number of fish species occur 
only in local settings (Lilyestrom and Taphorn 1983; Taphorn 1989; 
Winemiller 199 1 : 12). One study showed that within a Venezuelan 
watershed, neighboring streams shared less than 50 percent of their 
species (Taphorn 1989). These data emphasize the need for site- 
specific fishery management that utilizes the input and experience 
of local residents and fishers. Yet, fishery researchers and govern- 
ment managers perceive local people as being incapable of running 
the fisheries effectively and sustainably. Governmental hesitation 
to devolve power is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the 
.. Portuguesa River watershed. 
Government Values Local Knowledge. Even though the 
utility of local knowledge to fisheries management has been dem- 
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onstrated (Christie et al. 1994: 105; Neis 1992; Ruddle 1994:28), 
government officials and fishery researchers often dismiss local 
knowledge as anecdotal and unscientific (Johannes 198 1 : ix; Neis 
1992: 166).Thus, a major challenge to CBM is government acknowl- 
edgement that local users have knowledge of experiences with, and 
connections to the fishery that give them management insight and 
long-term commitment to the resource. This will not be easy: 
Perhaps the most critical or difficult task is to re- 
form governmental institutions. It is difficult be- 
cause it demands that we dispel the myth that 
governments have the exclusive mandate and capa- 
bility to manage common property resources. 
(Renard 199 1 :7-8) 
In Venezuela, a fear of the "tragedy of the commons" 
(Hardin 1968) pervaded the management hierarchy and contributed 
to a widespread belief that the future of the fisheries lies in stronger 
rules and tougher enforcement (Agiiin 1997:6; Bohorquez et al. 
1997:40; Duran 1995:58; MARNR 1996a:42-43; Sanchez 1989:7). 
During interviews, government officials reacted negatively to 
proposed CBM: 
It's impossible! [The fishers] aren't able to care for 
the fishery because they are trying to catch as many 
fish as they can. If a fisherman is able to catch 5 
kilos, he isn't going to take only 3 and leave 2 kilos 
for tomorrow. He's going to keep them all. (GN1, 
personal communication, July 1998)' 
A government fishery researcher concurred: 
If the fishermen had control of the fishery, there 
would be no control. Putting them in charge would 
be the end of the fishery. (GN2, personal communi- 
cation, July 1998) 
I Codes used in place of interviewee names to maintain confidentiality. 
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In contrast, a respected leader and fisher in the Portuguesa 
River watershed held that local knowledge enables fishers to man- 
age the fishery more sustainably than the current top-down system: 
We're the ones who know the river. We know the 
movements of the fish, the rise and fall of the river. 
We know where they put their eggs and when to 
find them there. We know what we need to know 
to catch the fish, and we know what needs to be 
done to protect them. The fishermen are the only 
hope for the fish in the Portuguesa River. (QMI, 
personal communication, July 1998) 
The current lack of government faith in fisher management capacity 
is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River 
watershed. 
Rules are a Product of Participatory Choice. Management 
reliant on enforcement and policing is often ineffective where 1) 
funding and personnel are limited and 2) the resource base is vast 
and/or populations are migratory. This is the situation in Venezuela 
where top-down fishery management hinges on encounters between 
a limited number of the National Guard (enforcers) and fishers 
(local-users). Compliance that relies on fearlprobability of being 
caught, combined with pervasive bribery and corruption, has con- 
tributed to unregulated fishing in Venezuela. Thus, participation of 
user groups in natural resource management is critical. According 
to Gardner and Stem (1996:133), "rules that work are, first of all, 
the product of participatory choice: Most of the people who must 
abide by them have had a say in making and modifying the rules." 
If the resource users are involved in the creation of rules, then the 
rules will be perceived as more legitimate (McCay and Jentoft 
1996:243). If fishers are responsible for enforcement, issues of 
community commitment and individual status in the village can 
influence fisher behavior rather than just fear of punishment. 
Participation in both decision making and regulatory enforcement 
can increase compliance (Davis and Bailey 1996:26 1-2). 
Reflecting on regulatory inefficacy, a Portuguesa River 
\ fisher agreed that compliance would increase if fishers were re- 
sponsible for supervising themselves: 
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If we - the fishermen - had more responsibility for 
managing the fishery, it would be a very different 
story. First, it would be almost impossible to fish 
illegally without being discovered. Where can I go 
fishing that I won't run into one of my neighbors 
fishing as well? And I have respect for my 
neighbors. If they make the rules, and then find me 
breaking them, I am going to feel ashamed. (QM1, 
personal communication, July 1998) 
This supports research that involvement of the user groups in the 
formation of laws and regulations increases both acceptability and 
compliance (Davis and Bailey 1996:261-2). Gardner and Stern 
(1 99 1 : 137) provided this explanation for the fisher's attitude: "It 
only makes sense for an individual - even one who cares about the 
group - to exercise self-restraint if there is reasonable assurance 
that others will do the same." In the state of Portuguesa, the lack of 
fishery rules that are the product of participatory choice is a nega- 
tive indicator of CBM feasibility. 
Legal Status Given to Local Regulations. For CBM to occur 
"legal instruments are needed to provide the basis for the transfer of 
management responsibility from a central government agency to 
community organizations" (Renard 199 1 :6). Given the prevailing 
centralized approach, Venezuelan fisheries lack a legal framework 
legitimizing management decisions and processes at the local level. 
In the state of Portuguesa, the situation is made worse by a per- 
ceived triviality of existing regulations, further justifying the devel- 
opment and testing of locally-devised rules. According to a 
university researcher: 
The current laws are to blame for [the declining 
Portuguesa River fishery]. These laws exist on pa- 
per, but that's the extent. There is a lack of people 
to enforce the laws, and those that are [enforcing 
the laws] can typically be given some money to 
leave the fishermen alone. (UNZ1, personal com- 
munication, February 1998) 
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Rule-bending and corruption at higher levels contributes to 
a perceived lack of regulatory credibility. This further suggests that 
rules made at the village level may be more widely accepted and 
upheld by fishers, yet there is an absence of legal avenues for the 
creation of such local initiatives and regulations. In his evaluation 
of stewardship programs by private landowners, Cox (1995:245) 
observed that "while the enthusiasm of the individual on the land is 
critical, so is ... the passage of legislation that institutionalizes the 
mechanisms and arrangements needed for proper and comprehen- 
sive support of such a stewardship program." The lack of legal 
status lending credibility and stability to local initiatives is a nega- 
tive indicator of the feasibility of CBM in the Portuguesa River 
watershed. 
Corruption-Free, Fair Enforcement 
The importance of enforcement that is just, administered equally 
throughout a society, and free from corruption is emphasized by 
community management researchers (Gardner and Stern 1996; 
Ostrom 1990). Such a regulatory high-road is not currently found 
in the Portuguesa River watershed, counting as a strike against 
CBM feasibility. 
Bribes and Cheating Not Permitted. Bribery is common 
between fishers and regulators in the Portuguesa River fishery: 
The laws mean nothing as corruption is common- 
place within the government and managing agen- 
cies. Rather than enforcing the laws, the National 
Guard uses them as a means to manipulate the peo- 
ple into paying them money. Therefore, there' is 
absolutely no emphasis on conservation. (UNZ1, 
personal communication, June 1998) 
A Portuguesa River fisher described the enforcement of 
fishing regulations by the National Guard and the consequences that 
corruption has had on fishing activity and compliance: 
Now, I can go out and fish illegally day and night - 
using weir seines, snag lines, and poison - risking 
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only an encounter with the National Guard who I 
can pay off. And it makes no difference to me what 
[the National Guard] think of me because I have 
absolutely no respect for them ... Each one can be 
bought for a price. (QM2, personal communication, 
July 1998) 
The fisher's remarks demonstrate how the occurrence of bribery has 
weakened user group respect for the regulatory system and, conse- 
quently, the effectiveness of these regulations and enforcement in 
encouraging legal fishing practices. The current prevalence of 
bribing and cheating is a negative indicator of the feasibility of 
CBM in the Portuguesa watershed. 
SelJshness and Social Elites Not Awarded. In the Portu- 
guesa River fishery corruption often favors wealthy and politically 
powerful resource users. "This rewards the selfish at the expense of 
the resource and the people who depend on it" (Ostrom 1990-cited 
by Gardner and Stem 1996: 134-135). One fisher summarized: 
It is an unfair situation because the poor man, who 
is trying to find food and money for his family, is 
the man that suffers. The people without money 
are the people that the National Guard makes com- 
ply with the laws; they take their cast nets and their 
catch. But the rich man is the man who is able to 
do anything without consequence. If he takes along 
[$2-$10 dollars], he's able to pay the National 
Guard for fishing illegally. It is a system in which 
a few gain and the majority lose. (NF1, personal 
communication, July 1998) 
Even Portuguesa state fishery employees are affected by 
corruption in the government: 
Our fishery management is failing because the peo- 
ple in charge are augmenting their salaries with 
money that we need to protect the fishery. Each 
year we have less and they have more. Corruption. 
The people that are taking our money think only of 
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the money and don't think of how they are destroy- 
ing a river. (GN2, personal communication, July 
1998) 
A centralized management system that rewards selfishness and 
social elites is a negative indicator of CBM feasibility in the Portu- 
guesa watershed. 
Government Accountable to Local Users. Another indica- 
tion of devolution necessary for CBM is that resource users have 
sufficient political clout - regardless of their socio-economic status 
- to hold natural resource managers and government accountable 
for their management decisions and the subsequent consequences. 
"Successful management requires that a high degree of decision 
making and accountability be shared by fishers and government 
officials" (McGinn 1998:9). The combination of an exclusive, top- 
down management hierarchy and a growing rift between Vene- 
zuela's richest and poorest members of society (Boh6rquez et al. 
1997:46) has led to an overall inability of the rural populations to 
contribute to management decisions. This includes families living 
in the small, isolated fishing villages in the Portuguesa River water- 
shed. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Develop- 
ment (UNRISD) reports that "typically in most poor countries, and 
in many rich ones for that matter, the weaker and impoverished 
groups ... have little voice and a limited role in influencing govern- 
ment" (Ghai 1988:25). 
Factory pollution in the Portuguesa River watershed pro- 
vides an example of an alliance between the upper levels of Vene- 
zuelan society and the inability of rural villagers to voice concerns 
and affect change (for details see Zanetell 1999). Research has 
documented that untreated effluent from a sugar cane didillery has 
significantly lowered dissolved oxygen levels in the Portuguesa 
River (Hernandez 1992:6-7; Winemiller et al. 1996:27) inducing 
fish mortality during peak periods of alcohol production. Since the 
distillery opened in 1988, legal wastewater standards have not been 
met (MARNR 1996b) and local fishers have repeatedly reported 
fish kills to the government to no avail. A water quality expert in 
the state of Portuguesa observed: 
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To have power, one needs to have money ... The 
fishermen that are discovering these disasters and 
dead fish have neither money nor influence. Here 
in Venezuela, there is nothing that the poor fisher- 
man is able to do except watch the river dying. 
(UNZ2, personal communication, July 1998) 
This lack of status and power makes it difficult for rural fishers to 
hold natural resource managers and government officials in the 
state of Portuguesa responsible for their decisions and actions. The 
current lack of accountability is a negative indicator of CBM feasi- 
bility in the Portuguesa River watershed. 
Conclusion 
The results of our application of the CBM assessment framework to 
the Portuguesa River fishery suggest that while resource and user 
group characteristics lend themselves to CBM, its feasibility is 
severely limited by the negative influence of all government and 
institutional characteristics. The following discussion of the major 
challenges and barriers to CBM is based on the characteristics of 
the Portuguesa River fishery at the time of the study and stake- 
holder opinions quoted here were in regard to the study site only. 
Keeping the scope of the research in mind, it is plausible that the 
implications and recommendations of this study may shed light on 
other CBM projects and proposals in contexts where inter- 
community coordination is required and/or similar barriers of 
corruption and socio-economic/cultural divisions exist. 
For the characteristics of the resource, the assessment 
framework indicates that community-based stewardskip of migrat- 
ing fish populations will be challenging, requiring coordination 
among Portuguesa River watershed villages. However, the positive 
assessment of all the user group characteristics suggests that re- 
source challenges are surmountable. Villager fishery dependence, 
sense of community, and willingness to participate in community- 
based conservation efforts complement monitoring skills and re- 
source familiarity that lend themselves to watershed level fishery 
management. 
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The potential for inter-village coordination in the Portu- 
guesa River Watershed does not suggest that similar inter- 
community communication and cooperation would be likely or even 
feasible in other watersheds with different cultural and/or socio- 
economic characteristics. Davis and Bailey (1996) caution against 
assumptions of internal harmony or equity within fishing communi- 
ties. It is logical that any conflicts emanating from such internal 
differences would be exacerbated at the watershed - i.e. multi- 
community - scale. Wade observed that both cooperative and 
individualistic village societies exist (1988:2-3). Whereas the 
former could help inter-village coordination, the latter could hinder 
the efficacy of a watershed level CBM effort. The challenge of 
inter-village coordination, especially in non-cooperative circum- 
stances, is an important aspect of CBM feasibility in river systems 
and of migratory fish populations. This challenge and how the 
degree of inter-community coordination required may differ de- 
pending on the type of fishery (e.g., lake, coastal, migratory, non- 
migratory, etc.) is an area that merits further research. 
The assessment framework also illustrated that the current 
characteristics of the government and institutions are significant 
barriers to CBM feasibility in the Portuguesa River fishery. In 
particular, a top-down, regulatory hierarchy is not conducive to 
local participation and systematic corruption precludes sustainable 
resource management. In regard to the barriers to participation, the 
situation in the Portuguesa River watershed reflects conclusions of 
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(LNRISD) about community-based efforts generally: "Despite its 
promising potential, the participatory approach to development has 
made little headway in official programmes and policies at the 
national or international levels" (Ghai 1988:27). 
Government resistance to devolving power is a common 
phenomenon, especially in developing nations with longstanding 
socio-economic/ethnic divisions between the haves and have-nots 
(Freire 1970; Ghai 1988:25; Renard 199 1). 
Existing social, economic, political and cultural re- 
lations within communities and between communi- 
ties and government or NGOs are often highly 
resistant to change, precisely because they serve the 
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interests of those who play a key role in defining 
and maintaining these relations ... Most individuals, 
communities, projects and organizations fear 
change because of the potential for conflict, as well 
as the possible attendant loss of power, which this 
involves. (Leurs 1998: 133) 
The fruition of grassroots stewardship requires a climate of 
institutional openness in which traditionally dominant segments of a 
population empower the traditionally voiceless to have legitimate 
and meaningful input to the management process. Yet such a 
climate is not possible if the current notion prevails that local 
people are to be controlled by rather than included in management. 
Dismantling this notion and reforming Portuguesa River fishery 
management will not be quick or simple: 
In the final analysis, resource management is a po- 
litical process determined by factors of ideology, 
political economy and social relations. [CBM ap- 
proaches] clearly seek to contribute to a process 
that promotes social equity, respects popular needs 
and wisdom, and maintains cultural integrity and 
sovereignty. It is therefore not surprising that these 
orientations would meet with opposition where 
there is fear of such a process releasing new talents 
and redistributing power and responsibilities. Insti- 
tutional change will be slow, but it remains indis- 
pensable to achieve the goals of resource 
management and community development. (Renard 
1991:9) 
Yet, fear of and resistance to restructuring Portuguesa River 
fishery management should not overshadow the potential benefit of 
incorporating the assets of local users in sustainable resource man- 
agement: from their detailed knowledge about the resource, to their 
stake in its continuity, to their potential role in rule formulation and 
enforcement. 
Enabling local participation is one of the major barriers to 
CBM of the Portuguesa River fishery. Overcoming corruption in 
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the management hierarchy is another. Bribery as the dominant 
mode of operation is illustrated by a researcher's observation: 
It is a game of sorts that the fishermen and National 
Guard play with each other, exchanging favors for 
money and fish. (UNZI, personal communication, 
June 1998) 
A fisher concurred that fishery management of the Portuguesa 
River: 
. . . is like a game. From what I've seen, the Na- 
tional Guard has no interest in ending the game be- 
cause there is money involved. It isn't in their 
interest to share control of the fishery with us, be- 
cause it means less money for them. (EP1, personal 
communication, July 1998) 
The research of Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests that the 
interest of the fishermen and of the National Guard in playing the 
game of corruption stems from the same self-interest that univer- 
sally motivates human behavior, albeit with different outcomes in 
different contexts. In her examination of the causes and conse- 
quences of corruption in different countries throughout the world, 
Rose-Ackerman (1999:2) asserted that: 
. . . the motivator is self-interest, including an inter- 
est in the well-being of one's family and peer 
group. Critics call it greed. Economists call it util- 
ity maximization. Whatever the label, societies.dif- 
fer in the way they channel self-interest. Endemic 
corruption suggests a pervasive failure to tap self- 
interest for productive purposes. 
Rose-Ackerman continued that "self-interest and the public interest 
frequently conflict" (1999:225). For example, while the fisher 
(briber) and the National Guard (recipient) are the short-term bene- 
ficiaries, it is at the long-term cost of the Portuguesa River fishery, 
and ultimately, biodiversity. For this reason alone, intervention in 
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the current system of fishery management is justified, especially if, 
as Rose-Ackerman hints, there are avenues for harnessing the 
potential positive outcomes of self-interest. 
Despite the difficulty of reducing corruption in Portuguesa 
River fishery management, this challenge should be faced in Vene- 
zuela to prevent the prediction that the "Portuguesa River is fin- 
ished" (UNZ2, personal communication, July 1998) from becoming 
a reality rather than just a speculation. We do not claim to know 
how reform should occur, but policy and institutional adjustments 
should be based on a thorough understanding of the historical, 
political, cultural, economical and sociological dimensions of the 
Venezuelan freshwater fishery. Clearly, corruption is highly con- 
textual and such information is a necessary foundation for reform, 
yet we should be mindful of Rose-Ackerman's observation that 
"culture and history are explanations, not excuses" (1999:5). 
In response to fishery collapse, fishery officials and re- 
searchers in the state of Portuguesa are advocating for stricter rules 
and tougher enforcement (Agiiin 1997:6; Duran 1995:58; MARNR 
1996a:42-3; Sanchez 1989:7). Unless corruption is dealt with first, 
increased top-down regulation may exacerbate the problem by 
providing the National Guard and fishermen, both well-entrenched 
in the bribery game, more opportunities to exploit the fishery for 
personal gain. The bottom-line in eradicating corruption, according 
to Rose-Ackerman, is economical: reform must eliminate existing 
monetary incentives for bribery. 
Enforcement and monitoring are needed, but they 
will have little long-term impact if the basic condi- 
tions that encourage payoffs are not reduced, If 
these incentives remain, the elimination of one set 
of 'bad apples' will soon lead to the creation of a 
new group of corrupt officials and private bribe 
payers. (Rose-Ackerman 1999:6) 
In sum, our CBM assessment framework not only allowed 
us to evaluate the current feasibility of community-based fishery 
management in the Portuguesa River watershed in Venezuela, but 
also enabled us to identify the primary challenges and barriers to its 
fruition. The challenge of inter-village coordination appears sur- 
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mountable in the Venezuelan context. More significant barriers 
include a lack of avenues for local participation in fishery manage- 
ment and corruption throughout the regulatory system. These 
obstacles must be overcome to prevent declining fish species from 
succumbing to the irreparability of extinction. Our study focused 
on identifying these CBM barriers and discussing their implica- 
tions. The details of reform necessary to facilitate CBM are beyond 
the scope of this study. McCay and Jentoft (1996:246) aptly re- 
marked that "in fisheries management there is no clear-cut, once- 
and-for-all, practical solution to the question of institutional de- 
sign." It is apparent, however, that the collective knowledge of 
fishing villages and local fishers is the last untapped resource 
awaiting exploration and discovery in Venezuela. 
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